Election Chaos 🤯: Social Media & Betrayal 🗳️

July 26, 2026 |

Tech

🎧 Audio Summaries
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🧠Quick Intel


  • TikTok accounts promoted Calin Georgescu in the weeks leading up to Romania’s November 2024 presidential vote, with content viewed 120 million times.
  • Calin Georgescu won the first round of the Romanian presidential election with 23% of the vote.
  • Adriana Iamnitchi’s team was denied access to TikTok’s API under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) on October 28, 2025, due to failing to prove researcher status.
  • TikTok flagged 116,000 accounts as potentially compromised and took action against 27,000 fake accounts promoting Georgescu and the AUR party.
  • Following the annulment of the first round, Nicușor Dan defeated George Simion in the May 2025 runoff election.
  • Of 46 tracked DSA applications, TikTok approved 11 and rejected 14, while X approved 11 and rejected 12.
  • DRI sued X in February 2025 after X rejected their request to study political discourse ahead of Germany’s federal election in April 2024.
  • 📝Summary


    In the weeks preceding Romania’s November 2024 presidential vote, TikTok accounts shifted to promoting Calin Georgescu, whose hard-line views garnered 120 million views. Georgescu secured the initial election round with 23% of the vote. Researchers, led by Adriana Iamnitchi, sought to understand the monetization of this content through TikTok’s API, a request denied in October 2025 due to insufficient proof. Subsequently, TikTok flagged numerous accounts and removed thousands of fake accounts linked to Georgescu’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians. The initial vote was annulled, leading to a runoff where Nicușor Dan ultimately prevailed. Concerns remain regarding the quality of data provided by platforms like TikTok and X, as evidenced by the varying outcomes of Digital Services Act applications.

    💡Insights



    THE RISE OF DISINFORMATION: A SOCIAL MEDIA CASE STUDY
    TikTok, X, and Meta are facing scrutiny for allegedly withholding data required by the Digital Services Act (DSA), creating significant challenges for researchers investigating the spread of disinformation. The case of Calin Georgescu in Romania exemplifies this struggle, highlighting how platforms can be exploited to influence election outcomes through targeted content promotion. Georgescu’s unexpected victory in the initial round of the 2024 presidential vote, fueled by a massive, coordinated campaign on TikTok, demonstrated the potential for social media algorithms to amplify fringe narratives and significantly impact political landscapes. The subsequent annulment of the vote and the emergence of a coordinated network of fake accounts further underscored the vulnerabilities exposed by the manipulation of these platforms.

    DATA ACCESS DENIED: THE CHALLENGES FOR RESEARCHERS
    Researchers like Adriana Iamnitchi at Maastricht University have been systematically blocked from accessing crucial data necessary to understand the dynamics of online disinformation campaigns. Despite being legally entitled to access platform APIs under the DSA, researchers face a complex web of obstacles, including denied API requests, limited data quotas, and stringent security requirements. TikTok’s initial refusal to grant Iamnitchi access to data on monetized content related to Georgescu, coupled with the discovery of a 27,000-account fake engagement network, highlighted the critical information gap. The inability to fully investigate these networks underscores the limitations imposed by social media companies on independent research and the potential for manipulation to remain largely undetected. The shift towards content libraries and paywalled APIs, as seen with Meta’s CrowdTangle and X, has further exacerbated this problem, forcing researchers to rely on less comprehensive data sources or pay substantial fees for access.

    THE DSA’S UNREALIZED POTENTIAL: IMPLEMENTATION DEFICIENCIES
    The Digital Services Act (DSA) was intended to empower researchers with access to platform data, allowing them to identify systemic risks related to illegal content and threats to fundamental rights. However, the implementation of the DSA has been plagued by challenges, including varying approval rates across platforms (TikTok approved 11 of 13 applications, while X rejected 11 of 23), restrictive security requirements that are difficult for universities to meet, and narrow interpretations of “systemic risk” by platforms. The requirement for data to be stored on infrastructure disconnected from the internet, coupled with limited daily API request quotas, effectively disincentivizes researchers from utilizing the DSA pathway. Furthermore, the lack of a structured advantage for researchers to utilize this pathway, as highlighted by DSA40 Collaboratory data, contributes to a system where access is limited and reliant on voluntary reporting. Despite these challenges, the ongoing struggle to obtain data underscores the critical need for continued advocacy and reform to ensure the DSA’s intended goals are fully realized.

    THE DATA ACCESS BATTLE: A Legal and Regulatory Struggle
    DRI’s persistent efforts to gain access to X’s data for research purposes highlight a complex and protracted battle between social media platforms and academic researchers. Beginning with a denied request in April 2024 related to political discourse ahead of Germany’s election, and escalating through multiple legal challenges and court rulings, the situation underscores the significant obstacles researchers face when seeking access to vast datasets – particularly those held by powerful tech companies. The core of the issue revolves around the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the interpretation of its requirements regarding researcher access, revealing a fundamental tension between platform accountability and the pursuit of independent research vital to understanding and mitigating online risks. This ongoing struggle has prompted substantial regulatory action by the European Commission, demonstrating the seriousness with which the EU views the issue of data access and its potential impact on societal challenges.

    X’S RESPONSE AND THE EU’S REACTION
    X’s initial resistance to DRI’s API requests, followed by repeated denials for research related to Hungary’s election, exposed perceived “unnecessary barriers” to researcher access, as identified by the European Commission. This ultimately led to a €120 million fine in December 2025, a significant penalty demonstrating the EU’s commitment to enforcing the DSA. X’s appeal, characterizing the investigation as “incomplete and superficial” and raising concerns about due process, further intensified the conflict. However, X’s subsequent acceptance of a corrective action plan – encompassing improvements to researcher screening, free data provision, reduced processing times, and the removal of data scraping restrictions – represents a crucial shift. This plan, while viewed with skepticism by DRI, acknowledges the need for a more streamlined and transparent process for researcher access, signaling a potential path toward resolving the underlying disagreements. The Commission’s parallel efforts to engage with Meta and TikTok regarding burdensome researcher vetting procedures reflect a broader strategy to establish a standardized approach to data access requests across the digital landscape.

    RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
    The legal and regulatory hurdles faced by DRI and other researchers seeking access to platform data have significant implications for the types of research that can be conducted. The potential for X to be forced to release a complete list of an account’s followers – a provision enabled by the new non-public data regulations – offers a powerful tool for disinformation researchers. This expanded access allows for a more granular understanding of coordinated attacks, enabling analysts to map the intricate networks of interactions and amplification that characterize online manipulation. Despite the challenges, researchers remain cautiously optimistic about the potential of the new regulations, recognizing that their effectiveness will ultimately depend on X’s commitment to implementing the agreed-upon changes and demonstrating a genuine willingness to collaborate. Moving forward, continued scrutiny from the European Commission and ongoing dialogue between platforms and researchers will be essential to ensuring that the DSA truly serves its intended purpose: fostering responsible innovation and safeguarding the European Union from emerging online risks.